The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

CUA Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions

Faculty Scholarship

1997

The Real Reason for Religious Freedom
John H. Garvey
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Garvey, The Real Reason for Religious Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1997, at 13.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The Real Reason
for Religious Freedom
John H. Garvey

W

hy do we protect freedom of religion? The commonsense answer, which I think hits close to
the truth, is that we protect it because religion is
important. That simple answer creates serious problems for liberal theory, however, so it is seldom discussed or defended by legal writers.
Some say freedom of religion is important because
it is one way {though only one) of exercising our
autonomy as human beings interested in making our
own choices and shaping our own lives. Religious
devotees create lives for themselves around certain
kinds of beliefs and values. They will probably join a
community of like-minded people (a church). They
typically have ideas about their relationship to God
that orient them in their daily life. And so on. In
domg these things they are protected by what Laurence Trihe calls "rights of religious autonomy."
There is nothing unique about religious autonomy. It is a name for one set of choices people make
about how to live, but there are other sets of choices
within the field of autonomy: choices about reproduction, risk taking, vocation, travel, education,
appearance, and sexual behavior. For Tribe, religious autonomy is just one aspect of the larger
"rights of privacy and personhood."
Moreover, within the set of religious choices we
attach value to the act of choosing, not to particular
outcomes. A decision to reject God is entitled to the
same protection as a decision to follow him. As Gail
Mere] has put it, "Individual choice in matters of
religion should remain free: individual decisions are
to be protected whether they operate for or against
the validity of any or all religious views
The individual is freed from . . . the oppressive effects of government regulation in order to believe or disbelieve as
he chooses."

be Supreme Court has given some support to
T
the idea that autonomy is the value underlying
religious freedom. It held in Torcaso v. Watkins
(1961) that Maryland had violated religious freedom
by requiring state officeholders to declare their belief
in God. This suggests that the Constitution attaches
equal value to belief and disbelief: the important
thing is the choice, not the outcome.
This conclusion is hard to square with the language of the First Amendment, which protects only
the free exercise "of religion." Rejecting religion is
an exercise of freedom, but it is not an exercise of religion. (Amputation is not a way of exercising my
foot.) The free exercise clause by its terms seems
inconsistent with the idea of autonomy. It seems to
favor choices for religion over choices against religion.
One way to avoid this textual limitation is to define
"religion" very broadly—so broadly that even disbelief is a kind of religion. This is wbat the Gourt did in
interpreting the draft law {U.S. v. Seeger, 1965).
When I was a boy people were exempt from military
service if their "religious training and belief" made
tbem oppose war. Federal law defined religious
belief as "'an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation." The Supreme
Gourt interpreted the law with an eye on the free
exercise clause, and said that the question was
whether "the claimed belief occup[ies] the same place
in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in Crod
holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption." The idea of "God" is "more of a hindrance
than a help." We should think of God "not as a projection 'out there' oi beyond the skies but as the
ground of our very being." And "religion" is nothitig
more than "the devotion of man to the highest ideal
that he can conceive."
The autonomy theory views religious freedom
from an agnostic standpoint. That is hardly surpris-
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ing. It follows rather naturally from the
"autonomous" view of human nature. If you scratch a
person deep enough, the theory holds, you will find a
kind of free-floating self. If you looked at the surface
of my life you might say that I was a middle-class
Irish Gatholic, husband, father of five children, law
professor, part-time musician, Geltics fan, and so on.
I have naturally inherited a variety of moral convictions (those typical of bourgeois Gatholics, or
lawyers). I am also moved by various desires that
arise from and act upon the details of my life (I want
prestigious publishers for my books, money for my
children's education, time with my wife).
But my essential self is able to rise above these
details. It is unencumbered, unsituated. It can step
back from my habitual convictions and desires (my
first-order preferences), reflect critically on them,
and change them to suit its own plan (second-order
preferences) for what my life should be like. Exactly
where I get my second-order preferences is a matter
of some dispute. Some say that I am guided by reason
to universally applicable principles. Others say that I
just make them up. But everyone agrees that it's up to
me—to my unencumbered self—to choose them,
however I might find them.
This view of human nature is the basis for a powerful argument in favor of freedom. A just political
order has to take account of the way people really are.
It must, in other words, respect their freedom to act
as unencumbered selves on their second-order preferences. In the case of religion this means that it must
view them as persons choosing, from a detached
position, a theological orientation. This is what I
mean by saying that the autonomy theory assumes
the agnostic viewpoint. I might be a Gatholic in my
daily life, but that is a first-order preference. The real
me is able to step back from it, assume an agnostic
stance, and make a fresh start. I might then renew my
religious commitment; but I might reject it. It
doesn't really matter. The important thing is that the
real me should organize my life along lines it freely
chooses. The law protects religious freedom in order
to facilitate that choice.
The autonomy theory is in one sense too powerful.
It holds that a just society must let its citizens choose
how to live their own lives. Some of the relevant
choices are religious, so it follows that the government must: not interfere with tbem. But there is nothing special about religious choices in this argument.
They are on a par with promiscuous sex, cigarette
smoking, and the practice of optometry. Our
instincts and the language of our Gonstitution tell us,
though, that there is a difference. The Bill of Rights
protects the free exercise of religion. It says nothing
about free love, free trade, or excise taxes on tobacco.
What we need is an argument that is capable of protecting religion without protecting a lot of other
activities that we don't feel strongly about.
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aving said this much, I will not pursue the
point further. I want to turn instead to a
second problem with the autonomy theory. It concerns its assumptions about human nature. One is
the factual assumption that we are capable of stepping back from our convictions and desires and reorganizing them according to second-order preferences
that we freely choose. Another is the more valueladen assumption that we should do this in order to
live "authentic" lives. There are those who would dispute both assumptions, and people who want religious freedom are among those most likely to do so.
Gonsider first tbe factual assumption. It is inconsistent in several ways with recurring ideas in Ghristian theology. The notion of original sin is meant to
suggest the inherent imperfection of human nature.
In the strongest statements of this idea—Augustine's
is a good example—it entails our inability to master
sinful desires and to freely will doing good. In the
common phrase, human nature is the slave of sin.
The counterpoint to this unhappy view of human
nature is the idea of grace. It is a kind of sharing in
divine life, a power that enables us to control sinful
desire, live good lives, and win salvation. But grace is
given to us by God gratuitously. We can't call it down
with a rain dance, and we can't behave as we should
without it. It is out of our control. This aspect of
grace, followed to its logical conclusion, leads to the
Galvinist notion of predestination: our salvation is
entirely in God's hands, and some are not saved.

H

This view of human nature affects the way many
religious people look at the idea of choice. The individual does not have complete control over choosing
the religious option. It is God who makes the choice.
I might have to accept God's choice and cooperate in
carrying it out, but I am cast as a supporting actor.
Thus the Jews understand themselves as the chosen
people. Their stories tell of people pursued by God
and brought back to do his work. Jonah, called by
God to be his prophet, tried to escape on a boat for
Tarshish but was brought back by miraculous
means. In the New Testament, Jesus himself set the
example by praying before his death, "Father, if it be
thy will, take this cup from me. Yet not my will but
thine be done." God converted the apostle Paul by
striking him to the ground and blinding him. The
scholar Alan Simpson has argued that a similar experience of conversion is the essence of Puritanism.
Those who take this view of human nature will
also disagree with the autonomy theory about the
value of running our own lives according to our
second-order preferences. That is not the basis of real
freedom. Augustine claims, for example, that real
freedom is freedotn from tbe bondage of sin. And it is
out of the question for free will to realize tbis freedom
through its own power; this it can do only through the
grace of God. It sounds paradoxical, but it is accurate
to say that Christian freedom consists not in making
our own choices but in obeying the law of God.
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The autonomy theory, then, bases religious freedom on a view of human nature that many religious
people would reject. This need not be a fatal defect.
We also justify freedom of speech on grounds that
some speakers would reject—we say that it promotes
democracy, and yet we grant it to Nazis who don't
believe in democracy. But religious believers play a
crucial role in free exercise law. They are not like the
Nazis. They are like the New England town meeting—the paradigm around which the theory is built.
If the theory does not work for them there is probably
something wrong with it.
There is an additional doctrinal point. Free exercise law has a tendency to assume a kind of split-level
character. In addition to its other shortcomings, the
autonomy tbeory fails to explain this tendency.
In some areas of the law believers and unbelievers
get equal protection. This is how it is with compelled
worship and belief. Agnostics as well as Quakers can
object to a test oath. But there are other areas where
the law protects only believers. The free exercise
clause sometimes requires states to pay money to religious believers—as in paying unemployment compensation to those whose religion requires them to
abstain from work on certain days. It does not
require payment to agnostics. It excuses Amish children from public school, but not agnostics. It protects the internal affairs of churches but not other
associations against government interference.
In recent years the Court has shown an inclination
to even out these differences. It has held that the Constitution does not, as a general rule, require special
treatment for religiously required behavior. But this
principle is still subject to a number of qualifications. First and most obvious is the fact that the free
exercise clause still forbids discrimination against
religion. That in itself is a kind of special treatment.
There is no comparable rule protecting nonreligious
action. The army can't have a special rule against
yarmulkes. But it can have a role preferring
yarmulkes to other nonuniform garb. Second, the
Court has left standing all the old cases requiring
religious exemptions (the ones about government
benefits, school attendance, church affairs, and so
on). It has even enlarged upon some of these.
These different levels of protection suggest that
there are several principles at work in tbe law of religious freedom, not just one. The autonomy theory is
appealing in its simplicity. But it is too simple to
explain the actual complexity of the law.
he second standard argument for freedom of
religion is political rather than ethical. The
argument is that the denial of freedom causes strife
that leaves everyone worse off. We can find both comparative and historical evidence for this conclusion.
Lebanon, Iran, India, and the Sudan bave recently
seen violent struggles for religious supremacy.
England and much of Western Europe did so in the
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Supreme
Court has found parallels in early American history.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter argued in McGowan v.
Maryland i\96l), "In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions
and impositions of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience."
Like the autonomy theory, the political theory
tries to justify religious freedom from an agnostic
viewpoint. It stresses two kinds of harm that affect
unbelievers. One is civil war. Even noncombatanis
get killed in a civil war, and everyone suffers from the
collapse of the government and the economy. The
other harm is persecution. Unbelievers cannot be
prevented from practicing their faith. (They have
none.) But if the government wants to compel a particular form of religiotis observance it might have to
"torture, maim, and kill . . . 'atheists' or 'agnostics'"
along with nonconforming believers (Zoracli v. Clauson, 1952).
This theory, like the autonotny theory, makes freedom universally available. But here the value of freedom is instrumental, not intrinsic. It leads to peace.
If it didn't, we would take another approach. The
autonomy argument, by contrast, said that freedom
was intrinsically good for people like us. Of course it
had to make some controversial assumptions about
what kind of people we were. It is a virtue of the
political argument that it dispenses with those
assumptions. And there is much else to recommend
it. It is realistic and practical, and goes some way
toward justifying a special place for religious freedom. It does, though, have some weaknesses. The
most important one is that it is incomplete.
Consider first the case of fringe groups. In American society there are, depending on how you count,
hundreds or thousands of them. They include small
but well-known sects (Hare Kiishnas. members of
Reverend Moon s Unification Church) and smaller,
little-known local cults. For my purposes they also
include unchurched believers—religious individualists who seek God in their own way. The political
defense of freedom gives no protection to these
people. If a group is sufficiently small the government can simply stamp it out without running the
risk of civil war. Of course civil war is only ont' kind
of strife. Stamping out fringe groups is persecution,
and the pohtical argument is designed to avoid that
too. But what exactly is wrong with fining, jailing,
medicating, religious eccentrics? These forms of
punishment and cure are not in themselves objectionable, the way cruel and tinusual punishment
would be. We routinely apply them to drug offenders
and think that we're doing the right thing. The obvious answer is that there is a difference between religious activity and drug dealing: one is good and the
other is bad. But that argument, which I will develop
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further below, takes us beyond our concern witb
political strife.
So tbe political strife argument doesn't protect
groups wbo can't figbt because tbey're too small.
Neitber does it protect groups (some of tbem large)
wbo are unwilling to figbt. Tbe Amisb on principle
flee from controversy and escbew politics. Quakers
are well known for their pacifism. Groups tbat are
far larger engage in many practices tbat tbey see as
desirable but not essential, and tbat tbey would not
defend witb violence. Consider the employment
practices of Catholic scbools. Tbe political defense
of freedom gives no sbeltcr to tbese groups if tbey
pose no threat to peace.
I tbink we can state tbese objections in an even'
more general form. Tbe political explanation tells
us tbat freedom is good because it brings peace. It
does not tell us why we should prefer freedom to
other means of bringing peace. It gives us no reason
to object to the suppression or tbe establisbment of
religion, provided the job is done rutblessly enough
to prevent civil war. Religion was an insignificant
cause of strife in the Soviet Union from Stalin's time
until very recently. There was little freedom, but that
is no objection if all that matters is peace. The obvious advantage of freedom is that it respects piety as
well as peace. But we need an argument tbat will tell
us why it is good to respect piety.
he best reasons for protecting religious freedom
rest on the assumption that religion is a good
T
thing. Our Constitution guarantees religious freedom because religious people want to practice tbeir
faith. As Mark DeWolfe Howe said in The Garden
and the Wilderness (1965): "Though it would be possible . . . tbat men who were deeply skeptical in religious matters should demand a constitutional prohibition against abridgments of religious liberty, surely
it is more probable that the demand should come
from those who themselves were believers."
One form of distinctively religious action is tbe
performance of ritual acts. Tbese include prayer and
otber kinds of worsbip; compliance witb sumptuary
rules governing dress, diet, the use of property; tbe
observance of sacred times (feasts and holy days) and
places (pilgrimages to shrines); rites connected with
important events in the believer's life (birth, death,
maturity, marriage); and so on.
Acts like tbese make sense only in the context of an
entire religious tradition. Acts of worship presuppose a belief in a supreme being. In Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam, God is described as tbe Creator,
Lord, and Judge of tbe world we live in. Tbe believer
tbinks tbat acts of worsbip are good because ibey
please God or harmonize with the order of nature.
Other forms of prayer presuppose a belief in a transcendent reality—a kind of life outside our world tbat
is more real tban our own, and tbat affects us in
miraculous and mundane ways. We may go on living
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tbere (in beaven or bell) when we die. Prayer is the
means by which we communicate with and try to
influence this reality. Still other rites presuppose tbe
existence of a social organization tbat enables likeminded people to act togetber. Some are led by a specialized class of functionaries who teach, supervise,
and minister to ordinary members.
bere is in our traditions a religious argument for
religious freedom tbat is peculiarly associated
witb ritual acts. It is, simply, tbat it is futile to coerce
people to perform ceremonies (prayer, worsbip, declarations of belief) tbey don't believe in. Tbis idea has
ancient roots, but it was most fully developed by
English Protestants during tbe seventeentb century.
Locke appeals to it in bis Letter Concerning Toleration: "True and saving religion consists in tbe inward
persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can
be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, tbat it cannot be compelled to the
belief of anything by outward force." Coercion can be
worse than futile—it can be counterproductive. In
Milton's phrase, to force a ritual performance is "to
compel hypocrisy, not to advance religion."
In modern free speech law we often run across the
idea that the mind is a private domain which the government should not, and as a practical matter
cannot, enter. Locke's and Milton's claims are different. They rest on a religious idea about our relations
with God. Coerced ritual is futile because it cannot
put tbe soul in toucb witb God. Tbe individual
cannot bear God unless be bas faitb. And faith does
not come to people just because they go through the
ritual motions. God gives it to whom he wills. It is an
idea characteristic of Protestantism that this happens
in a very individual way. The most effective medium
is Scripture, through which God may speak to the
pious reader.
This distinctively Protestant "right of private judgment" began as a protest against tbe Gatbolic
Cburcb's claim to mediate between God and individual souls, but it served equally well as an objection
against state mediation. Roger Williams underlines
tbe connection in The Bloody Tenent: "In vain have
English Parliaments permitted English Bibles in the
poorest Englisb bouses, and tbe simplest man or
woman to searcb the Scriptures, if yet against their
souls' persuasion from tbe Scripture, tbey sbould be
forced (as if tbey lived in Spain or Rome itself wilbout tbe sigbt of a Bible) to believe as the Church
believes."

T

et me turn now to a second form of religious
^ action, and a different argument for religious
freedom. Members of a religious tradition typically
want to acquire and spread knowledge about the esoterica of their beliefs, ritual forms, ceremonial duties,
and so on. These special kinds of religious truth are
often set down in sacred texts (Bible, Torah, Qur'an)
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and elaborated upon in written and oral commentaries (Talmud, Sunna). Believers like to study these
texts and commentaries, to discuss them with others,
and in some traditions to bring them to tbe attention
of unbelievers.
Tbose wbo feel tbis way sometimes argue that tbe
freedom to acquire and spread religious knowledge
leads us to tbe truth. We inherit this idea, like the
last, from seventeenth-century English Protestantism. It is the message of Milton's Areopagitica—
an expression of Puritan faith published in the same
year as Roger Williams' Bloody Tenent. Milton
offered several reasons why unlicensed printing
would promote the discovery of religious truth. One
was the now familiar claim that truth will prevail
over falsehood in any free encounter. A less familiar
but more radical idea was tbat God's revelation is
progressive. This makes free inquiry not only safe
but actually desirable. Individual tbinkers may
wander astray, but the net social effect of freedom is
to bring us closer to God. "To be still searcbing wbat
we know not by wbat we know, still closing up trutb
to trutb as we find i t . . . tbis is tbe golden rule in I beology as well as in Aritbmetic, and makes up tbe best
harmony in a Cburcb."
Let me reempbasize tbat tbese two arguments
(futibty, truth) rest on religious premises (faitb is a
gift; revelation is progressive). Tbey will convince
only religious believers. But within tbat group tbey
bave carried tbe day. Consider tbe current positions
of tbe Catholic Cburcb and tbe Presbyterian
Churcb—tbe two cbief targets of Puritan polemicists
like Milton and Williams.
Tbe Catbolic Cburch's Declaration on Religious
Freedom was promulgated during tbe Second Vatican Council in 1965. Tbe Declaration offers several
reasons for protecting religious freedom. Prominent
among tbem is the idea that faitb arises tbrough
internal communication between God and the individual: "For of Its very nature, the exercise of religion
consists before all else in those internal, voluntary,
and free acts whereby man sets the course of his life
directly toward God. No merely human power can
eithercommandor prohibit acts of this kind." Equally prominent is tbe notion tbat freedom assists tbe
searcb for religious trutb: Truth "is to be sought after
in a manner proper to the dignity of the human
person and his social nature. The inquiry is to be
free, carried on with tbe aid of teacbing or instruction, communication, and dialogue. In the course of
tbese, men explain to one anotber tbe truth they have
discovered, or think they have discovered, in order
thus to assist one anotber in tbe quest for trutb."
Tbe 200th General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) adopted a Policy Statement on religious liberty in 1988. It too offers a variety of reasons
for securing freedom. One is tbat faith cannot be
coerced: "Religious insigbt and faitb come from
God, wbo exists over and beyond tbe powers and
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principalities of eartb. Such insight and faith are recognized and received; tbey can neitber be commanded or controlled by civil authority, military power, or
religious piety." Tbe otber is tbat control of religion
inevitably leads to suppression of tbe truth, because
"tbere are no foolproof buman mecbanisms by wbicb
to test tbe authenticity of insigbt claimed to be from
God."
et me turn now to a tbird variety of religious
J action, and a different argument for religious
Lfreedom.
Religious believers are often bound by special moral obligations. These come from a moral
code that has some supernatural sanction (tbe
balakbab in Judaism, tbe sbari'a in Islam). Sucb a
code often demands forms of behavior tbat tbe rest of
society views as supererogratory, morally neutral, or
even (occasionally) wrong. A violation of tbe moral
code may be seen as sometbing worse tban a breach
of duty—as a kind of personal barm or insult to tbe
author of tbe code, whicb calls for repentance and
migbt be punished or forgiven on a transcendent
level.
About these kinds of actions we migbt say tbat tbe
government sbould not force people to violate moral
duties if (in tbeir system of bebef) tbey will face transcendent consequences. Otherwise tbe believer mit^bt
bave to cboose between violating tbe law and risking
damnation. This is how it was with the early Mormons who were convicted of practicing polygamy.
Or the believer might be forced to forgo a great good.
In one of the Supreme Court's recent cases an .\merican Indian complained that the government's use of a
social security number for his daughter would "rob
[her] spirit."
Of course the government often causes great harm
to unbelievers as well. A religious pacifist fears for
bis salvation wben be is drafted, but tbe average
Marine also suffers at tbe tbought of leaving his
family and going into combat. From a religious
point of view, though, the cases are not comparable.
The harm threatening tbe believer is more serious
(loss of heavenly comforts, not domestic ones) and
more lasting (eternal, not temporary). Tbat is wliat
justifies this special kind of freedom to religious
claimants alone.
This is a consequentialist argument for freedom
(though the consequences it relies on are religiotis).
But we could also make a nonconsequentialist argument . Moral codes impose religious duties, and tbere
is sometbing uniquely wrong witb forcing people to
violate a religious duty even if tbey are not primarily
concerned about final rewards and punisbments.
Strict Calvinists, for example, see no connection
between the performance of religious duties and election lo beaven. But tbey can still demand religious
freedom. Tbe focus of their claim is not tbeir own
destiny. Tbey are concerned instead witb tbe effect
on God, as it were—they bave to disappoint him in
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order to comply with the law. The individual places
great value in keeping faith with such duties, and it is
this value that religious liberty protects.
These arguments about suffering and duty differ
from the earlier arguments about futility and truth.
Claims about suffering and duty focus on the personal interests of religious believers. They are an appeal
to rights in the modern sense—a form of protection
for people wbo are losers in tbe political process.
Claims about tbe futility of coercion and tbe discovery of trutb focus on a larger social interest. "We will
all be better off," tbe believer says, "if we allow religious freedom."
Along with this difference in focus goes a difference in coverage. The earlier arguments apply uni-'
versally. Coercion is futile no less for atheists than for
Catholics and Jews. God may give them faith or he
may not. but tbe government can't belp him out. So
too with the discovery of truth. It's no use letting
only right-thinking Christians searcb, because we're
talking about revelation and God can reveal bimself
to anyone. As tbe Gospel says, "Tbe spirit blows
wbere it wills." Tbe arguments about suffering and
duty, by contrast, offer protection only to religious
believers. Tbe sufferings of tbe faitbful are special
precisely because tbey believe in beaven, bell, eternal
life, and so on. Tbe believers' duties are more compelling just because tbey arise from God's commands.
This explains what I have called tbe split-level
cbaracter of free exercise law. In some areas tbe
clause protects everyone. Tbis bappens when we are
dealing with ritual acts and the pursuit of knowledge. Atheists and Quakers alike can object to laws
prescribing forms of faith (test oaths) and worship
(school prayers). Anyone can object to a law tbat forbids inquiry (tbe teacbing of evolution) for religious
reasons. Likewise anybody can object—on free exercise as well as free speecb grounds—wben tbe government tries to limit communication about religiously significant questions. Tbese matters are all
covered by the first set of principles: compelled belief
is futile; revelation is progressive.
In other areas the free exercise clause protects only
religious believers. The cases wbere tbis bappens are
cases about compliance witb a moral code. Tbe
believer's faith might require him to leave his job, or
school, or the army. The Supreme Court used to give
serious consideration to all such claims. Today it is
harder to get special treatment, but it is not impossible. And it remains true now, as before, that "to have
tbe protection of tbe Religion Clauses, tbe claims
must be rooted in religious belief" (Wisconsin v.
Voder, 1972). Tbis disparity is explained by the
second set of principles: believers face a special kind
of suffering; tbey are subject to a bigber kind of duty.
Tbe draft cases do not fit tbis picture. None of tbe
reasons I bave given seems to cover tbe conscientious
objection of nonreligious young men to service in tbe
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armed forces. But we should not generalize from
tbese cases, any more than we sbould make death
penalty cases tbe pattern for rules of criminal procedure. Killing is an extreme act, and tbe feeling of
dread tbat attends it can give even nonreligious
duties an absolute cast.
bave argued tbat we should take the believer's
viewpoint rather than the agnostic's viewpoint in
tbinking about religious freedom. But my argument
seems incomplete. It relies upon reasons that only
some people find convincing. And sometimes it protects freedom only for those wbo are convinced. How
can sucb a lopsided idea justify one of our basic constitutional rigbts?
I admit tbat my argument for religious freedom is
lopsided, but I want to stress tbat tbis is not as serious
a problem as it migbt appear. Tbis is so, first of all,
because it does not require agnostics to give up
sometbing for notbing. Free exercise law has a splitlevel cbaracter. On one level it gives special protection to religious believers. But on anotber level it
treats everyone alike. Tbe government can't force
anyone to perform ritual acts, and it can't interfere
with the pursuit of religious knowledge. Tbis means
tbat everyone bas a reason to support some degree of
religious freedom.
Tbe standard arguments assume the agnostic
point of view because tbey want a rule of religious
freedom tbat is fair to everyone. Fairness here has two
dimensions. One is consent. Universal consent is a
good indication that a rule treats everyone fairly.
(That is why social contracts are always adopted
unanimously.) The agnostic point of view tries to
base freedom on principles everyone can agree with.
Revelation is out because it's hidden from some
people. We are asked to look instead at facts about
human nature and our social situation: the autonomy argument refers to the unencumbered self; tbe
political strife argument refers to the causes of war
and peace.
Tbe other dimension of fairness is reciprocity. A
contract is fair in this sense if the parties share equally in the benefits of the bargain. The autonomy argument satisfies this condition by making religion just
one of many protected choices, and by offering equal
religious freedom to believers and unbelievers. The
political argument says that freedom results in a
public good (peace) tbat everyone enjoys.
Tbe religious defense of free exercise is lopsided
because it violates these conditions of fairness. Tbe
principles tbat it relies on to justify freedom—futihty, truth, suffering, and duty—all refer in some way
to religious beliefs tbat many people do not hold.
Tbis makes it hard for some people to consent. The
religious defense also gives special protection to
some kinds of religious action. That is, it excuses religious actors from some generally applicable laws
wben tbeir moral code requires some other course of
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conduct. This violates the condition of reciprocity.
Why should we prefer an argument of this kind to
arguments that seem to satisfy tbe canons of fairness?
or several reasons. First, tbe standard arguments
F
themselves fail tbe test of fairness. Tbe autonomy
tbeory, like my own tbeory, appeals to assumptions
about human nature (the unencumbered self, the
value of authenticity) that are inconsistent with convictions that many religious people hold about original sin, grace, faith, and revelation. In the real world
these people would not consent to a social contract
based on autonomy. To avoid this problem the theory
asks everyone to assume the agnostic viewpoint. But
why not ask agnostics to assume tbe religious viewpoint? Tbat too would produce unanimous consent.
It would not be consistent witb liberal tbeory,
because it commits us to a view of the good before we
have resolved the issue of rigbts. But we can't assume
tbe correctness of liberal tbeory. Tbat is the very
question we're debating. If my tbeory won't get universal consent, neitber will tbe autonomy tbeory.
Tbe political strife tbeory is flawed in tbe same way.
It asks us to make tbe empirical assumption tbat we
can only have civil peace through religious freedom.
But there are other ways of avoiding strife; repression

is one of them. Unless freedom bas some other good
points, there is no reason to prefer it over repression.
There is reason to doubt, then, tbat tbe standard
arguments are more fair tban mine. My own
approach, on tbe otber band, bas some real strengths
that they lack. It is the most convincing explanation
for why our society adopted tbe rigbt to religious
freedom in tbe first place. It is possible to imagine a
society of skeptics insisting on a free exercise clause,
but tbe idea is far-fetcbed.
Tbe religious justification is also the reason why
many, perhaps most, religious believers claim the
right to freedom today. It enables them to perform
tbeir religious duties and to avoid religious sanctions. It allows them to pursue the truth, as God
gives them to know the trutb. And no other course
could bring tbem closer to God.
Finally, tbe religious justification is tbe only convincing explanation for tbe split-level cbaracter of
free exercise law. Sometimes religious believers and
nonbelievers are treated alike; but sometimes tbe law
protects only religious believers. Tbis is not sometbing that we can explain by appeals to consent and
fairness. It violates the canon of reciprocity. The only
convincing explanation for such a rule is tbat tbe law
tbinks religion is a good tbing. 0

The Muse in Brighton
Tbe beauty school on Brigbton Lane
spills pink-smocked girls at twelve o'clock
Tbey blossom cigarettes and talk,
pluck lilacs from tbe parisb green
and plant them in their bair for spring.
But tbe bells of St. Columbkille's clang
and Brigbton mourners dim tbe street,
witb roses on tbe bearse's seat
to take them to the grave.
And all tbe novice scissors stop,
and all tbe young beauticians hold
to see tbe rosewood in tbe cold
be taken to the grave.
Lady, in tbe flower I bear tbe bell
tbe green tongue tolls, and in tbe swell
of young girls' breasts I bear the sound
tbat stills tbe city to tbe ground
and makes tbe shurring scissors shut
and stops the lover as he woos.
It's death undying is our muse.
J. Bottum
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